Introduction
Several authors have studied the implications of solidarity conditions in particular models of pure public choice. 1 This paper unifies results obtained in each of these particular models into a general theory, applicable to a large class of pure public decision models.
Solidarity is a general principle of justice. It says that when circumstances change, all agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all weakly win, or they all weakly loose. We investigate here two particular formulations of this principle. Population-monotonicity ( Thomson, 1983a Thomson, , 1983b applies to the arrival and departure of agents. Replacementdomination (Moulin, 1987) applies to changes in preferences. We restrict attention to models of pure public decision. In particular, alternatives are "anonymous", in the sense that they do not contain agent-specific provisions, such as transfers, or the allocation of commodity bundles to particular agents, and that the set of admissible preferences is the same for each agent. This excludes any resource allocation problem with any type of private consumption, or phenomena such as crowding.
For example, the citizens of a nation choose the location of their capital, the colors and design of the national flag, the philosophical and moral principles underlying the Constitution and the laws governing the nation. A company's executives and board choose a name, an image, etc.
Pure public decision models also serve as benchmarks in the study of models of non-pure public decision, for situations where assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii) can only be thought of as approximations.
All existing studies on solidarity conditions in pure public choice rely on a particular underlying geometric structure. For example, Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thomson (1997) model the set of alternatives as a segment over which agents have single-peaked preferences (see section 2). Other models depart from this benchmark by analyzing different underlying geometric structures. Our starting point is the observation that, although, in each of these models, solidarity conditions characterize a certain model-specific class of social choice functions, many properties common to all these functions do not depend on the geometry, nor on any other specificity of the model. As we show, solidarity conditions, together with weak additional requirements, have the same implications in any model of pure public decision, regardless of its specific underlying geometry, and regardless of any other type of specificity in the model.
In this paper, we first establish that solidarity with respect to changes in preferences is generally a stronger requirement than solidarity with respect to the arrival and departure of agents, in the following sense. Any social choice function f for a pure public choice problem (with a variable population), that satisfies replacement-domination, together with weak additional conditions, must be population-monotonic (section 4). In addition, any social choice function f for a pure public choice problem, that satisfies at least one of our conditions of solidarity, together with weak additional conditions, must have the following properties. (a)
The decision only depends on which preferences are represented in the population by at least one agent, not on how many agents represent each of these preferences, nor on their labels. In other words, neither labels nor numbers matter (section 4). We call this property "represented-types-only". (b) The social function admits at least one status quo point, i.e. an alternative always Pareto-dominated by the choice of the function (section 5). In particular, whenever the status quo point is Pareto-efficient, either it is chosen, or an alternative Pareto-indifferent to it is selected. (c) The social choice function satisfies coalition-strategy-proofness, which means that no coalition of agents can manipulate the choice so as to benefit all members of the coalition (section 6). In particular, it satisfies the weaker condition of strategy-proofness.
We prove that all these implications are general. They hold regardless of the specifics of the particular model under consideration, such as the cardinality of the set of alternatives, the cardinality of the set of admissible preferences, the richness of this set, and whether or not it has any kind of geometric structure. In particular, single-peakedness of the preferences is not required for any of the above implications to hold. Even completeness of the preferences is not required for most of them to hold. We then turn to the particular geometric models studied in the literature on pure public decisions (section 7). We show that in almost all of these models, (existing or new) characterizations of solidarity can be obtained as corollaries of our previously listed general implications of solidarity. Last, we verify that no further unexpected general logical relations hold among the conditions we study (section 8).
A class of models
Let A be a set of alternatives, finite or infinite, with generic element denoted by a. Let N be an infinite set of potential agents with generic agent denoted by i.
This set can be either countable or uncountable. A population is a non-empty finite subset N ⊂ N of the set of potential agents. This set can be interpreted as the set of agents actually present in the economy. Agents have preferences over the alternatives. A preference R is a binary relation on A that is reflexive and transitive.
We do not require preferences to be complete. We say that two alternatives a and b are comparable for the preference R if either a R b or b R a. Let P and I be the associated strict preference and indifference relations. Preferences may be restricted to belong to a certain set, which represents the constraints imposed on the model by the situation to which the model applies. One important assumption is that these constraints affect all agents in a symmetric way, so that this set is common to all agents. Throughout the paper, let R be a set of admissible preferences, common to all agents. A pure public choice model with a variable population is a triple
For all population N, a preference profile for N is a list R N = (R i ) i∈N ∈ R N of |N | preferences indexed by N. Let U (R) be the union of all R N for all (non-empty and finite) populations N. This is the set of all admissible preference profiles, for all populations. A choice function f prescribes an outcome for any population and any profile of admissible preferences. It is a therefore a mapping
Our critical assumptions in the above setup are the following. (i) The set of alternatives A is fixed and does not depend on the population. (ii) Each preference R ∈ R is defined over the fixed set A. (iii) The set of admissible preferences R is common to all agents and fixed. This excludes in particular any resource allocation problem with any type of private consumption, or phenomena such as crowding.
We do not impose any additional assumptions on A and R. In particular, these sets may be finite or infinite. Preferences may or may be geometric structured, and may or may not satisfy regularity assumptions.
Conditions
To define our conditions, it is useful to define the Pareto-domination relation. For all A that assigns to each profile R N the set of Pareto-efficient alternatives for R N . A highly desirable property, for a social choice function is that, for any profile, the function select a Pareto-efficient outcome for this profile.
A social choice function f satisfies Pareto-efficiency if for all R N ∈ U (R) , we
Let us now present two formulations of the principle of solidarity. The principle says that when changes in the economy occur, all agents who are not directly responsible for these changes should be affected in the same direction: either they all weakly win or they all weakly loose. The first formulation applies to changes in population. It says that when a new agent joins the economy, the agents who were present before the change and whose preferences were kept fixed should all weakly loose, or they should all weakly win.
A social choice function f satisfies population-monotonicity if, for all profile R N ∈ U (R), for all agent i ∈ N \ N , and for all preference R i ∈ R, either we have
If f is Pareto-efficient, the choice f (R N ) is Pareto-efficient for the initial profile R N , and an increase in population by exactly one agent cannot lead to a Paretoimprovement for R N . From this observation, it follows that population-monotonicity and Pareto-efficiency generally imply the following stronger condition.
A social choice function f satisfies population-monotonicity + if, for all two
Lemma 1 Let f be a social choice function that satisfies population-monotonicity
and Pareto-efficiency. Then it satisfies population-monotonicity + .
Introducing one-by-one each of the agents in M , we obtain the desired conclusion.
The second formulation of the principle of solidarity applies to a change in the preference of exactly one agent within a same population. It says that when the preference of one agent changes, all the other agents whose preferences are kept fixed should either all weakly loose or they should all weakly win.
A social choice function f satisfies replacement-domination if, for all profile R N ∈ U (R), for all agent i ∈ N \ N , and for all two preferences
We will study separately the implications of each of these two formulations of the principle of solidarity. Population-monotonicity restricts the behavior of a social choice function f across populations, but replacement-domination does not require any sort of consistency across populations. Since in our model, the population is variable, it is natural, when studying replacement-domination to impose a condition that restricts the social choice across populations with similar compositions. For all
, we say that R M is a replica of R N if there exists an integer k such that for all preference R ∈ R, the number of agents in R M having preference R is exactly k times the number of agents in R N having the same preference R, i.e.
Our next condition, which we use when studying replacement-domination requires a social choice function to select, up to Pareto-indifference, the same alternative for any economy an all of its replicas.
A social choice function f satisfies replication-indifference if, for all profiles
In particular, this condition restricts a social choice function to select, up to Pareto-indifference, the same alternative for any two economy such that one is obtained from the other by relabeling agents. This last weaker requirement is the condition of anonymity.
A social choice function f satisfies anonymity if, for all
In this paper, we investigate the implications of population-monotonicity and Pareto-efficiency on the one hand, and replacement-domination, Pareto-efficiency and replication-indifference, on the other hand. The next three sections are devoted to an analysis of the implications of each of these two combinations of axioms.
Represented-types-only
In this section, we obtain two types of results. First, we observe that solidarity and additional conditions imply represented-types-only, a significantly stronger indifference condition than anonymity (Lemma 2). Represented-types-only requires that the choice for any profile only depend on the preferences that are present in the profile, not on the labels or number of the agents who have each of these preferences, up to
Pareto-indifference for these preferences. Second, we establish a general relation between the two solidarity conditions. We prove that replacement-domination together with Pareto-efficiency and replication-indifference implies population-monotonicity, regardless of the set of admissible preferences (Theorem 1). This establishes as a general result the observed pattern, in the literature on solidarity in public decision models, that replacement-domination is at least as strong as population-monotonicity. 
There exists a natural integer K and a sequence
of profiles in R L satisfying the following four conditions:
only differ by the preference of exactly one agent h (k). Consider such a sequence. For all k = 0, ..., K − 1,
. By conditions (ii) and (iii) , this statement is equivalent to the con-
As an immediate corollary of Lemma 2, under Pareto-efficiency, populationmonotonicity implies anonymity. Observe that replication-indifference alone implies anonymity, but in general, it does not imply represented-types-only.
Theorem 1 Let f satisfy replacement-domination. Suppose further that f satisfies either (i) represented-types-only, or (ii) Pareto-efficiency and replication-indifference.
Then f satisfies population-monotonicity. 
Proof. By Lemma 2, it suffices to prove case (i). Let R N ∈ U (R), let i ∈ N \N , and
R i ∈ R. Let j ∈ N and define R i := R j . First, by represented-types-only, f (R N ) I N f (R i , R N ) . Second, by replacement-domination applied to profiles (R i , R N ) and (R i , R N ), either f (R i , R N ) R N f (R i , R N ) or f (R i , R N ) R N f (R i , R N ) . Since f (R N ) I N f (R i , R N ) , we obtain that either f (R N ) R N f (R i , R N ) , or f (R i , R N ) R N f (R N ) ,
Status quo points
An alternative a * is a status quo point for a social function f if a * is always weakly
Pareto-dominated (for the relevant preference profile) by any alternative selected by f . In other words, a * ∈ A is a status quo point for f , if for all R N ∈ U (R) , we have
This definition implies, in particular, that if a * is a status quo point for f, then either a * or an alternative that is Pareto-indifferent to a * is selected whenever a * is Pareto-efficient. Following the definition, the set of status quo points for f is
For a general social function f , this set may contain more than one element, and it may also be empty. Our main results in this section say that, in any model (A, R)
satisfying certain minimal requirements, if f satisfies one of the solidarity conditions and additional weak assumptions, then f admits at least one such point. To state the first result of this type, we need the following definition. Given a topology T on Proof. By Lemmas 1 and 2, and Theorem 1, it suffices to prove that (i) is sufficient.
Theorem 2 Suppose that there exists a compact topology T on
First, we show that for any finite subcollection C ⊆ U (R) , the intersection
be a profile obtained by relabelling each agent in profile R N k , while keeping its preference fixed. By anonymity, for each
is an element of the above finite intersection for the family {R N k } K k=1 , which is therefore nonempty. Since each preference in R is lower-hemi-continuous, then each set
is a collection of closed sets that satisfies the finite intersection property. Since T is compact, then the set of status quo points of f is nonempty.
The existence of a topology satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3 should be understood as a joint condition on A and R. Indeed, when such a topology exists, then the topology T * generated by the collection
is compact. All preferences in R are lower-hemi-continuous for this topology. Therefore the conditions on A and R in Theorem 3 can be replaced by the compacity of T * . These conditions are also equivalent to the condition that any subcollection of the above collection admit a finite subcollection that covers A. When A is finite, the conditions on (A, R) in Theorem 2 are obviously satisfied. We thus have the following result. 
Lemma 3 Let f satisfy Pareto-efficiency and either (i) population-monotonicity; or (ii) replacement-domination and replication-indifference. Then for all R
Proof. By Theorem 1, it suffices to prove that (i) is sufficient, which we do R N ) and by the two previous relations, we Proof. By Theorem 1, it suffices to prove that (i) is sufficient, which we do next.
Let R * L ∈ U (R) be a finite profile as rich as R. 
Counterexample
The assumptions on (A, R) in Theorems 2 and 3 are weak. We now show that when they do not hold, the conclusion of the theorem fails. Let A = [0, 1] . For all a ∈ A, let R a be the preference relation such that for all x ∈ A we have a P a b and for all x, y ∈ A\ {a} , we have x I a y. Let a be the "peak" of preference R a . Let 
This social choice function is Pareto-efficient and population-monotonic. It even satisfies replacement-domination. But it has no status quo point.
Coalition-strategy-proofness
In this section, we analyze the relation between solidarity and the two following important conditions of robustness to preference manipulation. A social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if no agent can benefit from misrepresenting her true preferences, regardless of the preferences reported by all other agents:
A social choice function satisfies coalition-strategy-proofness if no coalition of players can jointly benefit from jointly misrepresenting their preferences, regardless of the preferences reported by all agents outside the coalition:
The most important and useful result in this section, Corollary 2, says that in a domain of complete preferences, under Pareto-efficiency, a social choice function satisfies population-monotonicity iff it satisfies strategy-proofness and representedtypes-only, and iff it satisfies coalition-strategy-proofness and represented-types-only.
For a general set of (not necessarily complete) preferences, only an implication holds, which is our first result in this section.
Theorem 4 Let f satisfy Pareto-efficiency. If f further satisfies either (i) populationmonotonicity or (ii) replacement-domination and replication-indifference, then f is coalition-strategy-proof.

Proof. By Theorem 1, it suffices to prove case (i)
be a profile obtained by relabelling agents in profile R M , while keeping preferences fixed and let R L ∈ R L be a profile obtained by relabelling agents in profile R M , while keeping preferences fixed. First, by population-
. Since P L and P M define the same relation, this is equivalent to say that we do not have
When preferences are incomplete, the condition of strategy-proofness can be strengthen as follows. A social choice function f satisfies strong-strategy-proofness if each agents weakly prefers to report his true preferences, regardless of the preferences reported by all other agents:
Our next result provides a partial converse to Theorem 4.
Lemma 4 If f satisfies strong-strategy-proofness and represented-types-only, then
f satisfies population-monotonicity.
Proof. Let R N ∈ U (R), let i ∈ N \N and let
. This is shown in two steps. Let j ∈ N and define R i := R j .
First, by represented-types-only, f (R
In the case where R is a set of complete preferences, this notion and the generally weaker notion previously defined coincide. Thus for complete preferences, strong-strategy-proofness can be replaced with strategy-proofness, in Lemma 4. This observation and Theorem 4 yields the following important equivalence.
Corollary 2 Let R be a set of complete preferences. Let f satisfy Pareto-efficiency.
The three following requirements on f are equivalent.
i). Population-monotonicity. ii). Strategy-proofness and represented-types-only. iii). Coalition-strategy-proofness and represented-types-only.
When preferences are complete, strategy-proofness and strong-strategy-proofness coincide, so that together with weak additional conditions, either condition of solidarity implies the strong notion, as a consequence of Theorem 5. How much completeness is needed in the set R for solidarity (together with weak additional as- 
Proof. Equivalence (i). The converse implication is implied by implication (iii)
of Theorem 3 We now prove the direct implication. Let
, f is strategy-proof. Therefore it suffices to prove that the two alterna-
First, by population-monotonicity
, then by weak-completeness of R, the alternatives f (R i , R N ) and
Implication (ii) follows from equivalence (i) and Theorem 1.
For an application of Theorem 5 to a specific model with incomplete preferences, see Corollary 8 in the next section.
Implications for particular models
In this section, we examine several particular models of pure public choice. In some of them, solidarity conditions have been studied, in other they have not. We show that many of the existing results can be obtained as corollaries of the general implications obtained in this paper and known results on strategy-proofness. We provide a new characterization on one domain where solidarity was never studied, the domain of single-plateaued preferences over a segment.
From strategy-proofness to solidarity
For each of the particular models we consider next, we show how our results in previous sections yield characterizations of solidarity. In each model, we follow an identical reasoning, which we explain once and for all. For each model, we start from an existing characterization of the rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency and possibly another property X. Let F be the class of such rules.
Corollary 2 then tells us that the rules that satisfy population-monotonicity, Paretoefficiency and X form a subclass G ⊆ F, which is exactly the set of rules in F which, in addition, satisfy represented-types-only. When F is known, identifying the subclass G is very easy. In most cases, the class F can be described as a parametrized family with a parameter in a certain set. Further imposing represented-types-only simply further restricts the set of admissible parameters to a subset. Finally, Theorem 1 tells us that the class of rules that satisfy replacement-domination, Paretoefficiency and replication-indifference, and X form a subset H ⊆ G. In many cases, G and H turn out to be equal, but this is not always the case.
A natural starting point is to consider the set R GS of all complete strict orderings over a set of alternatives A GS containing at least three elements. Solidarity conditions were never analyzed in this model. Theorem 3 enables us to do it. Unsurprinsingly, this leads to a negative result. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) proved that on such a domain, any social choice rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency and strategy-proofness must be dictatorial. This well-known result, together with our Corollary 2 and Theorem 1 implies the following.
Corollary 3 There exists no social choice function U (R GS ) → A GS that satisfies Pareto-efficiency and population-monotonicity. There is no social choice function U (R GS ) → A GS that satisfies Pareto-efficiency, replication-indifference and replacement-domination.
This negative result motivates the search for existence results for solidarity conditions on restricted set of admissible preferences. Let A be the interval Corollary 5 (Klaus, 1999 (Klaus, , 2001 Vohra, 1998) . The only social choice functions We now turn to a model in which results on strategy-proofness exist, but nothing is known on solidarity. This is the domain of single-plateaued preferences, studied by Berga (1998) . Interestingly, the target rules in this model are strongly strategy-proof, and weakly coalition-strategy-proof, but not strongly coalition strategy-proof, which proves that weak completeness is not a sufficient condition for solidarity and Paretoefficiency (and replication-indifference) to imply strong coalition-strategy-proofness.
From solidarity to strategy-proofness?
In some models, the implications of solidarity conditions are well understood, even though the implications of strategy-proofness are not. The models studied by Gordon (2003a, the discrete case), Miyagawa (1998 Miyagawa ( , 2001 , and Ehlers (2002 Ehlers ( , 2003 fall in this category 5 . These authors characterize in these models the set of social choice functions that satisfy population-monotonicity and Pareto-efficiency, along with the subset of social choice functions that satisfy replacement-domination, Paretoefficiency and replication-indifference. Corollary 2 tells us that these characterizations provide a starting point and a hint towards a characterization of strategyproof and Pareto-efficient social choice. Indeed, strategy-proofness is populationmonotonicity without represented-types-only. 5 Gordon (2003a) studies a model where the set of alternatives is a circle and the set of admissible preferences R is a finite set of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Gordon provides characterizations of solidarity in this model when R has a symmetric structure with respect to the circle and its cardinality is sufficiently small. For larger cardinalities, a negative result is obtained. Miyagawa (1998 Miyagawa ( , 2001 ) considers a model where two locations have to be chosen from an interval, when agents have single-peaked preferences over single locations. Preference comparisons of pairs of locations are solely determined by the preferred location in each pair. Ehlers (2002 Ehlers ( , 2003 considers a variation of this model, where preferences over pairs of locations are lexicographic. Preference comparisons of pairs of locations are determined first by the preferred location in each pair. Only in case of a tie is the second location taken into account.
Axioms independence
In this section, we examine the role of each axiom in Lemma 
Conclusion
This paper raises mainly two types of open questions for future work.
First, we developed a systematic way to study solidarity in public choice models.
In any new public choice model that anyone could come up with, our results provide a list of implications that provide a solid starting point towards a characterization on the basis of solidarity in any such model. In section 7, we have shown that old and new results on solidarity can be obtained as by-products of results on strategy-
proofness.
An example of a public choice problem that is not well understood, is the model studied by Ehlers (2002 Ehlers ( , 2003 , on the provision of multiple public goods, when agents have lexicographic preferences. In these papers, Ehlers provides a complete answer to the problems we address here, but only for the case of the provision of two goods. How to extend his results to more goods is not obvious, but our results provide steps towards this goal. All of our results apply, and yield several solid starting points. For example, we know that any social choice function that satisfies population-monotonicity and Pareto-efficiency admits a status quo point.
In the model with k goods, this means that there exists a vector of k locations that is always Pareto-dominated by the function, and is selected whenever it is Pareto-efficient. We also know that such a function satisfies coalition-strategy-proofness and represented-types-only. A similar remark applies to the model studied by Miyagawa (1998 Miyagawa ( , 2001 ).
Second, for public choice models where strategy-proofness is not well understood, we propose the study of solidarity as a preliminary step, that can potentially suggest what kind of functions are strategy-proof in these models. For example, in the model of Ehlers (2002 Ehlers ( , 2003 with two public goods, the set of Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof social choice functions is not known. But our Corollary 2 says that the intersection of this set with the set of rules that satisfy represented-typesonly is exactly the class of functions characterized in Ehlers (2003) . Therefore, Corollary 2 suggests the conjecture that the set of Pareto-efficient and strategyproof functions consist of functions resembling those described by Ehlers, but freed from an obligation to satisfy represented-types-only. A similar remark applies to the model studied by Miyagawa (1998 Miyagawa ( , 2001 and to any new model of public choice.
In such a model, our work indicated that studying solidarity is a natural starting point to study strategy-proofness.
Finally, an important question that we leave open is whether anything remains of our strong implications once our two public choice assumptions are relaxed. Obvious ways to relax these assumptions are the presence of money transfers, or to let preferences depend on the population, so as to allow phenomena such as "crowding".
